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Chapter 3
FROM FISCAL RESCUE TO
GLOBAL DEBT
1. Introduction
A broad consensus seemed to have been reached since
the onset of the financial and economic crisis that
governments needed to undertake collective action to
provide a fiscal stimulus to prevent a deep and long-
lasting recession. 
For example, a much-cited note by the IMF at the
end of 2008 argued that the “optimal fiscal package
should be timely, large, lasting, diversified, contin-
gent, collective and sustainable”.1
The European Council of the EU agreed a “European
Economic Recovery Programme” (EERP) in De-
cember 2008, which called for a discretionary fiscal
stimulus of at least 1.5 percent of GDP. This was re-
garded as “a crucial contribution to tackling the glob-
al economic crisis in which all countries with suffi-
cient fiscal space need to play a role in filling short-
term demand gaps”.2
At its meeting in April 2009, the G20 stated: “We are
undertaking an unprecedented and concerted fiscal
expansion, which will save or create millions of jobs
which would otherwise have been destroyed, and that
will, by the end of next year, amount to $5 trillion,
raise output by 4 percent, and accelerate the transition
to a green economy. We are committed to deliver the
scale of sustained fiscal effort necessary to restore
growth.”As recently as September 2009, the G20 stat-
ed: “We will continue to implement decisively our nec-
essary financial support measures and expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies, consistent with price sta-
bility and long-term fiscal sustainability, until recov-
ery is secured.”
The issues addressed in this chapter are:
• What has happened so far? What discretionary
stimulus has taken place? How does this compare
with the overall changes to fiscal positions? What
are the existing and projected levels of public debt
relative to GDP?
• Was the consensus correct? Did we need a fiscal
stimulus? Can we identify the effects?
• There is now significant concern about debt-to-
GDP ratios. Are they too high? How and when
should they be reduced?
2. What has happened to fiscal deficits during the 
crisis?
In 2009 every EU member-state government had a
budget deficit. In almost all cases, these deficits are
expected to rise in 2010. These deficits varied consid-
erably between countries, and the reasons for the size
of the deficit also varied. Most countries introduced
some discretionary fiscal stimulus in response to the
financial and economic crisis, by cutting taxes or
increasing spending. These discretionary measures
were small relative to the size of the deficits. 
In this section we present some evidence on the pat-
tern of the deficits both over time (since 2004, and up
to 2010 using European Commission forecasts), and
across countries. We also describe the extent to which
these deficits were generated by discretionary mea-
sures, and the extent to which they were due to reduc-
tions in tax revenues or rises in expenditure. 
A starting point is the measurement of government
debt. Measuring government indebtedness is diffi-
cult, since in principle it should include the extent
of future liabilities due to pension provisions and
other factors. There are also difficult issues with
respect to interventions in the banking sector. For
example, if a government guarantees a loan, then
typically that is not recorded as an increase in gov-
ernment debt, even though the government has a
contingent liability. Box 3.1 describes how such
financial sector interventions are typically recorded
in national accounts. The figures shown in this
chapter are taken from Eurostat and the European
Commission, which are based on a consistent
approach across the EU. 
1 IMF (2008).
2 European Commission (2009a).Table 3.1 shows the public sector
balances of each member state
since 2004; 2009 and 2010 are
projections made by the Euro-
pean Commission. It is clear that
deficits rose sharply in 2009. In
2007, the EU as a whole had a
deficit of only 0.8 percent of
GDP. That rose to 2.3 percent in
2008, and then jumped to 6 per-
cent in 2009, and to 7.3 percent
in 2010. 
Romania is the only country
that reduced its deficit between
2008 and 2009, but then it had a
relatively high deficit of 5.4 per-
cent of GDP even in 2008.
Some countries have seen a
notable worsening of the fiscal
position. Ireland jumped from a
small surplus in 2007 to a de-
ficit of 12 percent of GDP in
2009. Likewise, Latvia went
from a small deficit in 2007 to a
deficit of 11 percent of GDP in
2009. The UK also moved in a
similar way. 
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Box x 3.1 1  
Measuring g the e impact t on n government t debt t of f financial l sector r interventions s 
 
EU governments have made significant interventions into the financial sector since the beginning of the financial crisis.
The classification of the costs of these interventions, and their effect on various measures of government debt, are
generally estimated in accordance to the European System of Accounts 1995.
1
Several accounting issues arise with respect to financial sector interventions. One is whether the intervention represents an
institution becoming part of the public sector, and hence its debt becoming a public sector liability.
A second issue is which aspects of the financial accounts of an institution are relevant for measuring public sector debt.
The most commonly-used measure of public sector debt is known as public sector net debt. This includes the financial
liabilities of financial companies which have moved into public ownership. However, only current financial assets are
netted out against these liabilities. Because other financial assets are not included, the measure does not give a realistic
indication of the increase in the overall net indebtedness of the public sector. An alternative measure, general government
gross debt, does net off all financial assets, and can therefore give very different indications of debt.
For example, it is estimated that, for the UK, the total increase in public sector net debt as a result of financial sector
interventions is approximately £1.1 trillion to £1.6 trillion, which could raise the debt-to-GDP ratio in the UK by more
than 100 percent. (Only a small part of this increase is included in the figures shown here; by far the largest part of this
reflects the public ownership of Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and HBOS). But the increase in general government
gross debt is estimated at only around £77 billion. While this is still, of course, a large amount, it gives a very different
picture of the extent of the financial sector interventions.
Finally, government debt guarantees – including those in place before the crisis, and those introduced during the crisis –
are typically not included in the figures for debt, even though they represent a contingent liability on the government.
Table 3.6 on page 76 gives an indication of the extent of the public sector interventions in the banking sector during the
crisis.
1 See Eurostat (1995). The European Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics (CMFB) reviewed financial 
interventions and reported its opinion on their appropriate accounting treatment in March 2009. These were reviewed in detail by Kellaway (2009).
Table e 3.1 1 
Budget t balances s of f EU U member r states, , 2004–2010 0 
percent t GDP
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Austria – 4.5 – 1.7 – 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 4.2 – 5.3
Belgium – 0.4 – 2.8 0.2 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 4.5 – 6.1
Bulgaria 1.6 1.9 3.0 0.1 1.5 – 0.5 – 0.3
Cyprus – 4.1 – 2.4 – 1.2 3.4 0.9 – 1.9 – 2.6
Czech Rep. – 2.9 – 3.6 – 2.6 – 0.6 – 1.4 – 4.3 – 4.9
Denmark 1.9 5.0 5.0 4.5 3.6 – 1.5 – 3.9
Estonia 1.7 1.5 2.9 2.7 – 3.0 – 3.0 – 3.9
Finland 2.2 2.6 3.9 5.2 4.1 – 0.8 – 2.9
France – 3.6 – 3.0 – 2.3 – 2.7 – 3.4 – 6.6 – 7.0
Germany – 3.8 – 3.3 – 1.5 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 3.9 – 5.9
Greece – 7.4 – 5.2 – 3.1 – 3.9 – 5.0 – 5.1 – 5.7
Hungary – 6.4 – 7.8 – 9.3 – 4.9 – 3.4 – 3.4 – 3.9
Ireland 1.4 1.7 3.0 0.2 – 7.1 – 12.0 – 15.6
Italy – 3.6 – 4.4 – 3.3 – 1.5 – 2.7 – 4.5 – 4.8
Latvia – 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 4.0 – 11.1 – 13.6
Lithuania – 1.5 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 3.2 – 5.4 – 8.0
Luxembourg – 1.1 0.1 1.4 3.6 2.6 – 1.5 – 2.8
Malta – 4.7 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.2 – 4.7 – 3.6 – 3.2
Netherlands – 1.8 – 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.0 – 3.4 – 6.1
Poland – 5.7 – 4.3 – 3.9 – 1.9 – 3.9 – 6.6 – 7.3
Portugal – 3.4 – 6.1 – 3.9 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 6.5 – 6.7
Romania – 1.2 – 1.2 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 5.4 – 5.1 – 5.6
Slovakia – 2.4 – 2.8 – 3.5 – 1.9 – 2.2 – 4.7 – 5.4
Slovenia – 2.2 – 1.4 – 1.3 0.5 – 0.9 – 5.5 – 6.5
Spain – 0.4 1.0 2.0 2.2 – 3.8 – 8.6 – 9.8
Sweden 0.6 2.0 2.4 3.8 2.5 – 2.6 – 3.9
UK – 3.3 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 5.4 – 11.5 – 13.8
EU27 – 2.9 – 2.5 – 1.4 – 0.8 – 2.3 – 6.0 – 7.3
Source: 2004–2008, Eurostat; Forecasts 2009–2010 European Commission (2009a).EEAG Report 2010 73
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A small number of countries
have had substantial deficits for a
number of years: notably Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland,
Portugal and to a lesser extent,
the UK. There are significant dif-
ferences across counties in 2009,
ranging from Bulgaria with a
deficit of only 0.5 percent of
GDP, to Ireland with a deficit of
12 percent of GDP. 
These deficits were only partly
due to discretionary responses
to the economic and financial
crisis. This is shown in Table 3.2
which indicates the size of the
discretionary fiscal stimulus in
each country in 2009 and in
2010 (taking into account those
measures already announced).
These are measured relative to
the position in 2008, recording
all discretionary changes in
these two years. 
Almost all EU governments in-
troduced a fiscal stimulus in
2009, though some maintained
a neutral position. The largest
discretionary changes were in
Spain, with a stimulus of
2.3 percent of GDP, made up of an increase in
spending of 1 percent and a reduction in taxes of
1.3 percent. On average, though, the EU as a whole
introduced a discretionary stimulus of only 1.1 per-
cent of GDP. Note though that evidence presented
in Chapter 1 suggests that changes in structural
deficits – that part of the deficit that is not auto-
matic – were larger than implied by the discre-
tionary responses listed in this chapter.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 split up the deficits in each country
by considering the size of tax revenues (Table 3.3) and
public spending (Table 3.4) as a proportion of GDP.
Of course, there is considerable variation between
countries. Not surprisingly, the Scandinavian coun-
tries have the highest revenues: in 2009, Sweden has
revenues of 53 percent of GDP, Denmark 52.8 per-
cent, and Finland 52 percent. Their expenditures are
similarly high: 56.6 percent for Sweden, 55 percent for
Denmark and 52.8 percent for Finland. Some of the
newer members states are at the other extreme: Roma-
nia and Slovakia both have revenues of 32.2 percent
of GDP, and expenditures of 38.5 percent and
38.3 percent respectively. 
Across the whole of the EU, revenues have been very
consistent as a proportion of GDP, at just over 44 per-
cent in each of the 7 years shown. Revenues in 2009
and 2010 are lower than in the preceding years, but
only fractionally. There is more variation over time for
individual countries, although in most countries rev-
enues typically only changed in 2009 by less than one
percent of GDP. 
The substantial rises in deficits therefore appear to be
mainly driven by increases in spending as a propor-
tion of GDP, rather than reductions in taxation as a
proportion of GDP. Some countries – typically those
with large increases in their deficits – have seen sub-
stantial rises in spending as a proportion of GDP. But
note that GDP fell in many countries in 2009. The rise
in the spending ratio may therefore not represent only
a real increase in spending but also a reduction in
Table e 3.2 2  
Fiscal l stimulus s measures s in n 2009/10 0 
percent t GDP P 
2009 2010
Total Expenditure Revenue Total
Austria 1.8 0.4 1.4 1.8
Belgium 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cyprus 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
Denmark 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.8
Estonia 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3
Finland 1.7 0.6 1.1 1.7
France 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.1
Germany 1.4 0.6 0.8 1.9
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5
Italy 0.0 0.2 – 0.2 0.0
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luxembourg 1.2 0.1 1.2 1.4
Malta 1.6 1.3 0.3 1.6
Netherlands 0.9 0.4 0.5 1.0
Poland 1.0 0.3 0.7 1.5
Portugal 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.1
Romania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovakia 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.5
Spain 2.3 1.0 1.3 0.6
Sweden 1.4 0.6 0.8 1.6
UK 1.4 0.4 1.0 0.0
EU27 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.7
Figures for 2010 represent changes with respect to 2008, i.e. include permanent
measures taking effect in 2009 plus the net effect of measures taking effect in
2010.
Source: European Commission (2009a).GDP. By contrast, falling nation-
al income tends to reduce tax rev-
enues automatically: so it is likely
that revenues as a proportion of
GDP would remain relatively
constant in a downturn.
This analysis of revenues and
expenditures helps to identify
the automatic stabilisers of the
economic downturn. However,
other factors may also be rele-
vant. In some cases, such as the
UK, 2007 spending plans in-
tended spending to rise sharply,
financed by higher revenues.
Moving into the recession,
spending plans were not re-
duced, but revenues were much
lower than expected, leading to
the very high deficit. 
Where do these deficits leave the
level of outstanding debt as a
proportion of GDP for EU coun-
tries? For the EU as a whole, the
measured debt-to-GDP ratio has
increased from 58.7 percent in
2007 to 72.6 percent in 2009, and
it is projected to rise again to
79.4 percent in 2010. This figure
is likely to continue to rise even
after 2010. 
Of course, there is again consid-
erable variation across coun-
tries: from Estonia with debt of
under 7 percent of GDP to Italy
with a ratio of 113 percent.
There is some evidence that
countries with a lower debt ratio
before the crisis have responded
with a greater overall fiscal stim-
ulus. For example, Ireland’s
ratio shot up from 25 percent in
2007 to 61 percent in 2009, and
the UK from 44 percent to
68 percent. But there is little evi-
dence that this was a discre-
tionary response, whereby coun-
tries that were more able to pro-
vide a fiscal stimulus did so.
Instead, the underlying reasons
appear more to do with the
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Table e 3.3 3  
Revenues s of f EU U member r states, , 2004–2010 0 
percent t GDP P 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Austria 49.5 48.2 47.7 48.0 48.2 47.0 47.3
Belgium 49.1 49.4 48.7 48.1 48.4 48.5 48.2
Bulgaria 41.3 41.2 39.5 41.5 39.0 40.8 40.9
Cyprus 38.7 41.2 42.2 46.4 44.9 44.1 44.1
Czech Rep. 42.2 41.4 41.2 42.0 40.9 40.7 41.1
Denmark 56.4 57.8 56.6 55.4 55.4 52.8 53.4
Estonia 35.7 35.5 37.1 38.2 37.9 38.2 38.4
Finland 52.3 52.9 52.6 52.5 52.5 52.0 51.3
France 49.6 50.4 50.4 49.6 49.3 49.4 49.9
Germany 43.3 43.5 43.8 44.0 43.8 43.5 42.3
Greece 38.0 38.1 39.1 40.1 39.9 40.8 40.0
Hungary 42.6 42.3 42.7 44.8 46.5 46.1 46.4
Ireland 35.1 35.4 37.0 35.9 33.8 33.7 33.9
Italy 44.2 43.8 45.4 46.4 46.0 46.5 46.5
Latvia 34.7 35.2 37.7 35.5 35.5 34.1 34.7
Lithuania 31.8 32.8 33.1 33.9 34.0 34.8 36.0
Luxembourg 41.4 41.6 39.9 40.8 43.3 44.0 42.9
Malta 40.8 41.8 41.2 40.4 40.6 41.1 41.2
Netherlands 44.3 44.5 46.2 45.6 46.4 46.1 45.6
Poland 36.9 39.1 39.9 40.2 39.2 40.2 40.3
Portugal 43.1 41.6 42.3 43.1 43.2 42.6 42.4
Romania 32.3 32.3 33.1 34.0 33.1 32.2 32.5
Slovakia 35.3 35.4 33.5 32.5 32.7 32.2 32.1
Slovenia 43.6 43.8 43.3 42.9 42.7 41.7 41.6
Spain 38.5 39.4 40.5 41.0 36.6 36.4 36.9
Sweden 56.1 57.2 56.5 56.3 55.7 53.0 52.7
UK 39.6 40.8 41.6 41.4 42.3 41.4 41.6
EU27 44.0 44.4 44.9 44.9 44.5 44.3 44.1
Source: 2004–2008, Eurostat; Forecasts 2009–2010 European Commission (2009a).
Table e 3.4 4  
Government t Expenditures s of f EU U member r states, , 2004–2010 0 
percent t GDP P 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Austria 54.0 49.9 49.4 48.7 48.7 51.6 52.1
Belgium 49.5 52.2 48.5 48.3 49.9 48.5 48.2
Bulgaria 39.7 39.3 36.5 41.5 37.4 39.5 39.3
Cyprus 42.8 43.6 43.4 42.9 44.0 44.0 45.0
Czech Rep. 45.1 45.0 43.8 42.6 42.4 45.9 47.6
Denmark 54.6 52.8 51.6 51.0 51.7 55.0 57.0
Estonia 34.1 34.0 34.2 35.5 40.9 45.0 47.3
Finland 50.1 50.3 48.7 47.3 48.4 52.8 54.3
France 53.2 53.4 52.7 52.3 52.7 55.6 56.4
Germany 47.1 46.8 45.3 44.2 43.9 48.2 49.0
Greece 45.4 43.3 42.2 44.0 44.9 45.3 45.2
Hungary 48.9 50.1 51.9 49.7 49.8 50.8 52.0
Ireland 33.7 33.7 34.0 35.7 41.0 45.8 49.1
Italy 47.7 48.2 48.7 47.9 48.7 51.2 51.1
Latvia 35.8 35.6 38.2 35.9 39.5 46.8 49.8
Lithuania 33.3 33.3 33.6 34.9 37.2 39.5 42.7
Luxembourg 42.5 41.6 38.6 37.2 40.7 44.2 45.7
Malta 45.5 44.7 43.7 42.6 45.3 44.4 44.8
Netherlands 46.1 44.8 45.6 45.3 45.5 48.3 50.2
Poland 42.6 43.4 43.8 42.1 43.1 46.1 46.8
Portugal 46.5 47.6 46.3 45.8 45.9 48.9 48.7
Romania 33.5 33.5 35.3 36.6 38.5 38.5 38.9
Slovakia 37.6 38.2 36.9 34.4 34.9 38.3 39.4
Slovenia 45.8 45.3 44.6 42.4 43.6 47.7 48.6
Spain 38.9 38.4 38.5 38.8 40.5 45.2 47.1
Sweden 55.6 55.2 54.1 52.5 53.1 56.6 57.3
UK 42.9 44.1 44.2 44.0 47.7 50.5 52.4
EU27 46.9 46.9 46.3 45.7 46.8 50.1 51.1
Source: 2004–2008, Eurostat; Forecasts 2009–2010 European Commission (2009a)EEAG Report 2010 75
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planned spending prior to the crisis and the degree
to which the economies were affected by the finan-
cial crisis. 
We discuss the implications of these deficits and their
effects on the debt ratio in Section 4 below. 
3. Is fiscal stimulus effective? Evidence from the 
literature
Most economists and policymakers have agreed that
the adverse economic effects of the current crisis
could not have been contained without a strong fis-
cal stimulus. Nonetheless, there are also sceptics who
denounced the large fiscal expansions from 2008 as a
waste of resources that could actually jeopardise the
recovery because of their lasting negative impact on
government finances. Not surprisingly, the long-
standing debate on the fiscal transmission mecha-
nism, and especially on the size of the fiscal multi-
plier, is raging once again. In this section, we briefly
reconsider the theoretical and empirical arguments




els have explored a variety of
channels through which a fiscal
stimulus can affect the economy.
There are of course fundamental
differences across paradigms as
regards the effectiveness of fiscal
policy. Neoclassical models em-
phasize that fiscal measures are
either irrelevant (Ricardian equiv-
alence prevents tax cuts from
boosting private demand) or
counterproductive (public spend-
ing crowds out private spending).
Keynesian models emphasise that
fiscal policy can actually crowd-in
private expenditure, especially
when economic resources are
underutilised in a recession. An
important lesson from these con-
trasting theoretical analyses, how-
ever, is that the macroeconomic
response to fiscal expansion can
vary widely, depending on the
degree of slack in the economy,
the monetary policy response, as
well as the relevance of market distortions, ranging
from credit constraints and other financial imperfec-
tions to nominal rigidities. 
It is useful to start our analysis with a brief reconsid-
eration of the standard neoclassical model with flexi-
ble prices and well-functioning labour and goods
markets, see e.g. Baxter and King (1993). A specific
reason to do so is that this model clarifies the impor-
tant difference between wealth and substitution
effects from fiscal measures, which are often blurred
together in the popular account of the way fiscal pol-
icy works. In the classical exercise proposed by the lit-
erature, a temporary increase in government spending
is eventually matched by an increase in lump-sum tax-
ation which has the same present value (the timing of
taxes does not matter, as Ricardian equivalence holds
in this case). The increase in spending raises output
somewhat, but unambiguously lowers consumption.
The fall in consumption occurs for two reasons. First,
as agents anticipate rationally the time path of future
spending, they also feel that their net-of-tax wealth
has fallen by the full increase in the tax burden. Under
Table e 3.5 5    
Debt-to-GDP P ratios s of f EU U member r states, , 2004–2010 0 
percent t 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Austria 64.8 63.7 62.0 59.4 62.5 70.4 75.2
Belgium 94.4 92.2 87.9 84.0 89.6 95.7 100.9
Bulgaria 37.9 29.2 22.7 18.2 14.1 16.0 17.3
Cyprus 70.2 69.1 64.6 59.4 49.1 47.5 47.9
Czech Rep. 30.4 29.8 29.6 28.9 29.8 33.7 37.9
Denmark 43.8 37.1 31.3 26.8 33.3 32.5 33.7
Estonia 5.0 4.5 4.3 3.5 4.8 6.8 7.8
Finland 44.2 41.4 39.2 35.1 33.4 39.7 45.7
France 64.9 66.4 63.7 63.8 68.0 79.7 86.0
Germany 65.6 67.8 67.6 65.1 65.9 73.4 78.7
Greece 98.6 98.8 95.9 94.8 97.6 103.4 108.0
Hungary 59.4 61.7 65.6 65.8 73.0 80.8 82.3
Ireland 29.7 27.5 24.9 25.0 43.2 61.2 79.7
Italy 103.8 105.8 106.5 103.5 105.8 113.0 116.1
Latvia 14.9 12.4 10.7 9.0 19.5 34.1 50.1
Lithuania 19.4 18.4 18.0 17.0 15.6 22.6 31.9
Luxembourg 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.9 14.7 16.0 16.4
Malta 72.2 69.8 63.7 62.1 64.1 67.0 68.9
Netherlands 52.4 51.8 47.4 45.6 58.2 57.0 63.1
Poland 45.7 47.1 47.7 44.9 47.1 53.6 59.7
Portugal 58.3 63.6 64.7 63.5 66.4 75.4 81.5
Romania 18.7 15.8 12.4 12.7 13.6 18.2 22.7
Slovakia 41.4 34.2 30.4 29.4 27.6 32.2 36.3
Slovenia 27.8 27.0 26.7 23.4 22.8 29.3 34.9
Spain 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.2 39.5 50.8 62.3
Sweden 51.2 51.0 45.9 40.5 38.0 44.0 47.2
UK 40.6 42.3 43.4 44.2 52.0 68.4 81.7
EU27 62.2 62.7 61.3 58.7 61.5 72.6 79.4
Source: 2004–2008, Eurostat; Forecasts 2009–2010 European Commission (2009a).
 standard assumptions, agents react to the negative
wealth shocks by reducing consumption and leisure.
The reduction in leisure in turn implies an increase in
labour supply, which increases output and lowers the
real wage. The second effect works through intertem-
poral substitution of future for present consumption.
If the increase in spending is temporary, interest rates
(long and short) rise on impact, reflecting the relative
scarcity of current output due to the additional de-
mand by the government. In response to real interest
rate movements, households postpone their spending
plans. Similarly, real wages may temporarily rise in the
short run, creating an incentive to work more on
impact.3
The relative weight of these two effects, wealth and
intertemporal substitution of consumption, depends
crucially on the evolution over time of the change in
spending. If the increase in public expenditure is per-
manent and immediately implemented, it is the wealth
shock associated with the higher tax burden that con-
stitutes the lion’s share. Otherwise, most of the adjust-
ment in consumption and leisure is driven by
intertemporal substitution. To clarify this point, sup-
pose that, over the long run, the growth rate is zero
and the real interest rate is 3 percent. All else equal, a
temporary increase in spending as high as, say, 10 per-
centage points of GDP for one year would generate
tax liabilities reducing households’permanent income
by a mere 0.3 percentage points of GDP4 – quite a
small amount, relative to the size of the upfront
spending expansion.
The distinction between wealth and substitution
effects is a key element in assessing the effectiveness
of fiscal stabilisation policy. By its very nature, fiscal
EEAG Report 2010 76
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Table e 3.6 6  
Public c interventions s in n the e banking g sector r 
percent t GDP
Capital injections
Guarantees on bank 
liabilities
Relief on impaired asset and






















Austria 5.5 1.7 25.7 6.8 7.1 2 100 percent
Belgium 5.3 6.1 70.8 16.3 8.1 8.1 100
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Denmark 6.1 2.4 253 2.5 0.3 0.3 100 percent
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Finland 0 0 27.7 0 0 0 50
France 1.2 1.2 16.6 5.5 0.2 0.2 70
Germany 4.4 2 18.6 7.2 1.4 1.4 100 percent
Greece 2 1.5 6.1 1.2 3.3 1.8 100
Hungary 1.1 0.1 5.9 0 0 2.6 100 percent
Ireland 6.6 6.5 164.7 164.7 0 0 100
Italy 1.3 0.1 NA 0 0 0 c. 103
Latvia 1.4 0.9 25.7 2.8 10.9 4.7 50
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Luxembourg 6.9 7.9 12.4 NA 0.9 0.9 10
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Netherlands 6.4 6.8 34.3 7.7 11.4 5.5 100
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Portugal 2.4 0 10 3.3 0 0 100
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 percent
Slovenia 0 0.4 32.8 6.3 0 0 100 percent
Spain 0 0 18.6 2.1 2.8 1.8 100
Sweden 1.6 0.2 48.5 11 12.6 0 50
UK 3.5 2.6 21.7 11.3 16.4 14.7 50
EU27 2.7 1.7 20.5 7.8 2.1 1.4
Source: European Commission (2009b) 
3 While consumption is typically crowded out by government spend-
ing, investment can respond in different ways, depending on the spec-
ification of the model and especially on the persistence of the shock
to public spending. There are also a number of extensions of the
neoclassical model which could also accommodate a positive effect
of the rise in government spending on consumption. 
4 This result is obtained by calculating the constant flow of real
taxes, which is equal, in present discounted term, to the increase in
net debt financing the spending expansion. In the example in the
text, the increase in debt is 10 percentage points of GDP. 
Hence 10=Σ(1+r)t x=x(1+r)/h implies that the additional tax pay-
ment (x=.3/1.03) must be approximately equal to 0.3 per period.EEAG Report 2010 77
Chapter 3
stimulus is temporary. The wealth shock associated
with changes in the tax burden will affect house-
holds’ consumption decisions in a limited way. The
focus should instead be placed on “intertemporal
substitution”.
As stressed by the Keynesian literature, an important
argument in favour of fiscal stabilisation is provided by
models allowing for financial frictions. A fiscal stimu-
lus is likely to be effective, for instance, when some
households are credit-constrained, so that their spend-
ing decisions become sensitive to disposable income, as
opposed to permanent income. If current income
increases due to either a government expansion which
raises economic activity and therefore wage payments,
or a cut in taxes, these households are likely to spend
more. Depending on the proportion of credit-con-
strained households in the economy, the positive
response of their demand may drive up overall con-
sumption. Similar results may be predicted by models
where firms (entrepreneurs) are credit constrained,
although the transmission mechanism is different, see
e.g. Villaverde (2010) for a recent discussion. 
Models with nominal rigidities call attention to an
additional important element, that is, the interactions
among monetary and fiscal policy. In both the tradi-
tional and the new Keynesian models, the effect of a
fiscal stimulus is largely determined by the stance of
the central bank. The fiscal multiplier is indeed deter-
mined by the targeting rule (interest or exchange rate)
pursued by monetary authorities. For example, in the
classical Mundell-Fleming model, fiscal policy is
more effective if the country adopts a fixed exchange
rate regime, so that the domestic policy rate is
anchored to the foreign interest rate by the uncovered
interest parity condition. Similarly, in the new
Keynesian model, if the central bank could (and
would be willing to) target a constant interest rate in
real terms, under standard assumption this monetary
stance would completely determine the evolution of
consumption: any variation in government spending
would exclusively be reflected in changes in output
(Woodford 2010). The general point here is that some
degree of monetary accommodation in the short run
raises the macroeconomic impact of an increase in
government spending.
However, as consumers and firms are forward look-
ing, the impact of fiscal stimulus also depends on
(private expectations about) how fiscal consolida-
tion will take place in the future. Corsetti et al.
(2009a), for instance, show that fiscal multipliers are
higher if a short-run expansion in spending is even-
tually offset, at least in part, by a decline in spend-
ing below trend, rather than exclusively by a rise in
taxes. This is because the reversal in government
spending generates expectations of a decline in
short-term interest rates in the future, which has an
immediate effect on long-term rates. With sticky
prices (and a relatively accommodative monetary
stance), it is possible that this effect may dominate
the upward pressure on long-term rates resulting
from the additional government spending. It may
well be possible that consumption would be crowd-
ed in, rather than crowded out, on impact (see also
Chapter 1 in the 2009 EEAG Report).
Note that monetary and fiscal interactions in both the
short and the long run work mostly through the
intertemporal substitution channel already discussed
early on in this chapter, in particular through their
influence on the path of the long-term rates relevant
for private demand decisions.
A new generation of models building on Eggertsson
and Woodford (2004) suggest that the fiscal expan-
sions may be extremely valuable in deep recessions
in which monetary policy is constrained in setting
interest rates by the zero lower bound. In this case,
absent fiscal policy, deflationary pressures from
large recessionary shock may give rise to a defla-
tionary spiral: with the interest rate at zero, insuffi-
cient demand causes firms to cut prices; to the
extent that pricing decisions are staggered, falling
prices generate expectations of lasting deflation; for
a given nominal interest rate, these translate into
higher real rates; and higher real rates further weak-
en demand, reinforcing the fall in output. A fiscal
expansion can however stop this adverse mecha-
nism, by raising demand and therefore contrasting
the pressure towards lowering prices – a case dis-
cussed by Christiano et al. (2009), Corsetti et al.
(2010), Erceg and Lindé (2010) and Eggertsson
(2009) among others. These contributions are of
particular interest in the current situation, not only
because they explicitly address issues in fiscal stabil-
isation when interest rates are already effectively at
zero, but also because they provide theoretical
instances of very large multipliers for government
spending (although not necessarily for tax cuts).5
5 Eggetsson (2009) emphasises that, when monetary policy is stuck at
the zero lower bound, fiscal policies should aim directly at stimulat-
ing aggregate demand. These policies include temporary increases in
government spending and tax cuts, such as an investment tax credit
or a cut in sales taxes (by virtue of their direct effect on aggregate
demand rather than aggregate supply). Tax cuts that lower marginal
costs may instead exacerbate the risk of a deflationary spiral.Yet, they mostly rely on restrictive assumptions
regarding the origin of the shocks underlying the
global slowdown.
As discussed in last year’s EEAG Report, a leading
explanation of the unexpected and strong drop in
demand during the last months of 2008 and through-
out 2009 attributes the recession to a rise in perceived
uncertainty (see Chapter 2 of the 2009 EEAG Re-
port). Such an interpretation raises the issue of how
fiscal policy could stabilise inefficient and large fluc-
tuations in economic activity in the face of rising
uncertainty. This issue defines an important chapter
in the economics of fiscal stabilisation, largely yet to
be written. 
It is indeed plausible that during a financial turmoil,
when expectations are down, the role of fiscal policy
is to inject “optimism” in private markets, helping
people to re-gain confidence. Concretely, the govern-
ment could commit to insure people against some
very bad outcomes: to the extent that the crisis is dri-
ven by self-validating expectations, such a commit-
ment can in principle coordinate expectations away
from those outcomes. An advantage of this approach
to fiscal policy is that the premise of the stabilisation
strategy would be fully consistent with the leading
diagnosis of what causes the crisis.
The design of fiscal stabilisation coherent with this
view is however quite complex. Some of the trade-offs
are already debated heavily, by and large contrasting
the interests of Wall Street with the interest of Main
Street. Moreover, there is a budget constraint on the
stimulus: in light of the uncertainty surrounding their
effects, actions must be such that they do not put fis-
cal sustainability in peril. We will return to these
issues below.
3.1.2 Time series and panel analysis
Empirical work has generated a wide variety of esti-
mates of fiscal multipliers – that is, of the effect on
output of a fiscal stimulus. Certainly, we would expect
the multiplier to depend on the type of fiscal stimulus.
But the range of estimates generated in the literature
probably owes more to the difficulty of identifying the
effects, the variety of techniques used and the possi-
bility that the multiplier may vary over time and
across countries. The Box gives an indication of the
different approaches used to identify the effects of an
exogenous discretionary shock to government spend-
ing or taxation. 
The different approaches briefly summarized in the
Box have been used on aggregate data in a number of
countries to identify the sign and size of the multipli-
er effect, and the effect on other variables, such as
consumption, employment, interest rates and ex-
change rates. 
Tables 3.7 and 3.9 summarise some of the estimates in
the literature of the fiscal multiplier.6 The estimates
shown in these tables are – where it is possible to iden-
tify – the cumulative peak effect on GDP of an exoge-
nous shock to government spending (Table 3.7) or
taxation (Table 3.9). The cumulative peak effect can
occur immediately, or several quarters after the initial
shock. 
We will not discuss all of these papers. However, it is
worth exploring some of the results in a little more
detail. For example, in one well-known paper,
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) present results from two
models, which vary according to whether a determin-
istic or stochastic trend is added to the model. The
results shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.9 are for the latter
case. Looking at point estimates, output rises by 0.9
following a unit increase government spending. This
effect occurs in the first quarter, and thereafter
declines. By contrast, with a deterministic trend, the
peak effect reaches 1.29, but occurs only after
15 quarters. Since government spending is itself a
component of GDP, these two estimates generate dif-
ferent predictions for the sign of effect on the other
elements of GDP: negative under the stochastic trend,
and positive for the deterministic trend, although
both are close to zero.
Blanchard and Perotti develop their model further, in
an attempt to identify the effects on the different com-
ponents of GDP. Their results are shown in Table 3.8.
For both models, they find a positive effect on private
consumption, although the size of this effect is quite
different between the two models. This is inconsistent
with the basic neoclassical model, which would pre-
dict a reduction in consumption. They also find nega-
tive impacts on investment, exports and imports. Note
that the peak effect on GDP is not equal to the sum of
the peak individual components of GDP. This is
because the peak effects occur at different times. For
example, the peak effect on GDP overall with the
deterministic trend is in quarter 15. But in that quar-
ter, the cumulative effect on each of the components
is not at its maximum. 
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How large is the government spending multiplier?
Returning to Table 3.7, there is clearly considerable
variation in estimates of the impact of a shock to gov-
ernment spending on overall GDP. Most, though not
all, of the estimates are positive (with a few in excess
of 1). However, it is worth stressing that confidence
intervals are quite large: in most cases the point esti-
mates are not significantly different from zero. 
From a theoretical perspective, this overall conclusion
should not come as a surprise. Theory has long
emphasized that the effectiveness of fiscal stabiliza-
tion crucially hinges on financial development, trade
openness, the state of public finances, the exchange
rate regime and, last but not least, the health of the
financial sector, see e.g. Perotti (1999), Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990), Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000),
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2009), and Corsetti,
Meier and Mueller (2009b). Linear estimations aver-
aging out multipliers across economic conditions
(which can vary over time) may hide large and signif-
icant differences. For this reason, the fiscal transmis-
sion mechanism should be systematically analysed
conditional on different economic environments. 
Box x 3.2 2  
Estimating g the e fiscal l multiplier r 
A variety of techniques have been used to estimate the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on the economy, including the
effects on output, consumption, employment and other factors.
The starting point for most models is a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. This is of the form
Xt = A(L)Xt1 +Ut
where t X  represents a vector of variables (typically, output, government spending and taxation, although more recent
approaches include variables such as the stock of debt,  exchange rates and interest rates), A(L) is a distributed lag
function, and  t U is a vector of error terms. The key issue in using a VAR model is to identify the effects of an exogenous 
change to either government spending or to tax revenue. Four approaches have been used.
A recursive approach to estimating the effect of a shock to one variable (Sims, 1980) is to assume an ordering of the
variables such that one variable – typically government spending – does not react contemporaneously to other variables.
The second – typically tax revenue – responds contemporaneously only to the first, government spending. The third –
typically output – responds contemporaneously to both, and so on for more variables.
A structural approach (SVAR in Tables 3.7 and 3.9) is used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), based on a particular
structure of the residuals from the estimated relationship. External is used to identify the contemporaneous effects of
output on taxation and government spending. These generate instruments which can be used to estimate the
contemporaneous effect of taxation and government spending on output. Essentially, the idea is that there are decision and
implementation lags which prevent new government spending decisions in a quarter (year) from responding to
contemporaneous economic circumstances. Hence, innovations to spending not systematically explained by the evolution
of the business cycle (contemporaneous and lagged output gaps), the own dynamics of spending (lagged spending), and
the state of the public finance (debt) can be treated as unexpected (structural) shocks to fiscal policy, whose effect on the
economy gives information about fiscal transmission. A potential problem in this approach is that the variation in public
spending defining these fiscal shocks may actually be the subject of a political debate prior to implementation. Hence they
are to some extent anticipated by the private sector, and thus they cannot necessarily be treated as unexpected. As a partial
solution to this problem Beetsma et al. (2006) use annual instead of quarterly observations.
A “narrative” approach aims to exploit some clearly exogenous shocks to one of the variables in the system. For example,
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identify changes to government expenditure in several episodes of military build-up in the
USA. These episodes are exploited by introducing dummy variables into the VAR. The response of the system to these
dummy variables provides a direct estimate of the multiplier.
A clear advantage of a narrative approach is that anticipation effects can be accommodated in the estimation by tracing the
timing in which the political discussion about policies with clear fiscal implications (such as going to a war) begins. An
important open issue however is that the approach is more effective, the larger the variation in spending or tax changes to
be proxied by the dummies. Recent papers have encompassed both of these latter approaches: see Perotti (2007), Ramey
(2008). Perotti (2007) provides a useful comparison of these techniques.
A fourth approach is a sign restriction approach, proposed by Uhlig (2005), and used by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and
Pappa (2009a). This involves imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses of some variables.
A useful critical discussion of identification has recently been provided by Barro and Redlick (2009), who emphasize the
problem of reverse causation (output growth explaining more spending) in the macro literature. In their approach, the best
identification strategy consists of focusing on episodes of large variations in defence spending (for the US: World War II 
and the Korean War). Specifically, focusing on OECD countries, Corsetti et
al. (2009b) contrast average linear estimates of the
government spending multiplier, with estimates
explicitly allowing for “non-linearities”. In their
analysis, the estimated linear effect of a government
spending shock is in line with the VAR literature on
fiscal transmission: output and consumption multipli-
ers are small and positive; trade balance turns into a
deficit; the exchange rate experiences a short-lived real
appreciation, followed by a weakening. But these
average linear responses are not necessarily confirmed
when the estimation is conditional on specific eco-
nomic features/environments. In
accord with standard theory, the
study finds that spending policies
are more effective in relatively
closed economies (“openness
matters”) and under a peg (“the
exchange rate regime matters”);
and less effective or even counter-
productive in economies with
high public debt (“the state of
public finances matters”). 
Most strikingly, multipliers are
significantly larger during years
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Table e 3.7 7     
Estimates s of f the e effects s of f a a government t spending g increase e shock
Study y  Data a  Period d  Technique e  Multiplier r for r 
output t 
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) USA 1947–96  Narrative  approx 1 
Fatas and Mihov (2001) USA 1960–96  Recursive  0.3 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)  USA 1960–97  SVAR  0.9 
Australia 1960–79  SVAR –  0.1 
Australia 1980–01  SVAR 0.21 
Canada 1960–79  SVAR 0.59 
Canada 1980–01  SVAR –  0.28 
Germany 1960–74 SVAR 0.41 
Germany 1975–89 SVAR 0.4 
UK 1960–79  SVAR 0.48 
UK 1980–01  SVAR –  0.20 
USA 1960–79  SVAR 1.13 
Perotti (2005)
USA 1980–01  SVAR 0.31 
Heppe-Falk et al. (2006) Germany  1974–04  SVAR 0.62 
Ravn (2007) Australia, Canada,
UK, USA 
 SVAR 0.52 
Giordano et al. (2007) Italy  1960–79  SVAR 0.06 
USA 1980–06  SVAR 0.13  Favero and Giavazzi (2007)
USA 1980–06  SVAR 0.02 
Gali et al. (2007) USA 1954–03  SVAR 0.78 
USA 1955–06  Recursive 1 
USA 1955–06 SVAR 1
USA 1955–06  Sign restriction  approx 0.5 
Caldara and Kamps (2008)
USA 1955–06 Narrative 0
Beetsma et al. (2006) EU14  1970–04  Recursive  1.2 
De Castro and De Cos (2008) Spain  SVAR 1.31 
Ramey (2008) USA 1947–03  Narrative  approx 1 
Canada 1970–07  Sign  restriction  0.18 
EU 1991–07  Sign  restriction  0.16 
Japan 1970–07  Sign  restriction  0.13 
UK 1970–07  Sign  restriction  0.13 
Pappa (2009b)
USA 1970–07  Sign  restriction  0.74 
USA 1957–79  Recursive  1.71  Bilbiie et al. (2008)
USA 1983–04  Recursive  0.94 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) USA 1955–00  Sign restriction  0.44 
 
Table e 3.8 8  
Effects s of f government t spending g shock k on n components s of f GDP, , 





Peak effect Quarter Peak effect Quarter
Government spending 1.14  4  1.00  1 
Consumption 1.26  14  0.46  2 
Investment – 1.00  5  – 0.98  9 
Exports – 0.80  9  – 0.37  13 
Imports – 0.49  9  – 0.08  9 
GDP P  1.39 9  15 5  0.95 5  1 1 
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with financial and banking crises, identified using the
information in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Indeed,
during such episodes the point estimate for the output
multiplier is a multiple of the other estimates. While,
given the reduced number of observations featuring a
crisis (Spain, Japan, Finland and Norway), confi-
dence intervals are large, these results appear to cor-
roborate the argument that fiscal support to econom-
ic activity has been key to stabilising output during
the current crisis.
Table 3.9 summarises estimates of the multiplier
arising from a change in taxation. Beginning with
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) again, they find that
GDP falls by 0.7 in response to unit increase in taxes.
However, there is a large variation in estimates from
other papers. The sign of the effect on output is not
agreed, and neither is the size. One well-known
recent approach is that of Romer and Romer (2010),
who identify various exogenous shocks to taxes in
the US, and trace out their effects in a single equa-
tion model of output. They find a very high effect of
taxation. 
These results are challenged by Favero and
Giavazzi (2009). They point out various restric-
tions in the Romer and Romer approach – for
example, that only tax shocks are incorporated into
the model. Relaxing these restrictions, they find
much lower estimates: before 1980 the estimate
never exceeds 1, and after 1980 it is not significant-
ly different from zero. 
The extent to which multipliers change over time is
also examined in other papers. For example, Perotti
(2005) finds that multipliers are not constant over
time or across countries (see Tables 3.7 and 3.9). In
particular, this paper presents some evidence that the
size of the multiplier has declined over time. A num-
ber of possibilities for differences over time are dis-
cussed by Perotti, including countries becoming more
open and introducing flexible exchange rate regimes.
These explanations are consistent with the results in
Corsetti et al. (2009b). However, it should be kept in
mind that the export/GDP ratio is small in many
countries, and also that the evidence of crowding out
of net exports by fiscal shock is controversial. 
Another possibility is the gradual relaxation of credit
constraints over time. Since credit-constrained indi-
viduals are more likely to change their consumption
in response to a change in the real income, relaxing
these constraints is likely to reduce any positive effect
on consumption of a positive fiscal shock. 
However, while credit constraints may have been pro-
gressively relaxed with the process of deregulation
and market liberalisation, their incidence can still be
expected to fluctuate along business cycle move-
ments. This observation raises a fundamental prob-
lem of using the estimates in Tables 3.7 and 3.9 to
identify the effects of a fiscal stimulus during the
recession, as the extent of credit constraints is itself
affected by the recession. As the financial crisis in
2008–09 generally reduced the supply of credit, more
Table e 3.9 9     
Estimates s of f the e effects s of f a a tax x increase e shock
Study y  Data a  Period d  Technique e  Multiplier r for r 
output t 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)  USA 1960–97  SVAR – 0.69 
Australia 1960–79  SVAR 0.46 
Australia 1980–01  SVAR 0.36 
Canada 1960–79  SVAR 0.03 
Canada 1980–01  SVAR –  0.30 
Germany 1960–74  SVAR 0.22 
Germany 1975–89  SVAR –  0.02 
UK 1960–79  SVAR –  0.10 
UK 1980–01  SVAR 0.23 
USA 1960–79  SVAR –  0.69 
Perotti (2005)
USA 1980–01  SVAR 0.43 
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) USA 1980–06  SVAR 0.02 
USA 1955–06  Recursive  0 
USA 1955–06 SVAR 0 Caldara and Kamps (2008)
USA 1955–06  Sign restriction  – 0.8 
Romer and Romer (2009) USA Narrative – 3.0
Mertens and Ravn (2009) USA 1947–06  Narrative  – 2.17 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) USA 1955–06  Sign restriction  – 0.2 
 individuals are likely to have moved into a position of
being denied credit. That in turn would make a tax
cut, for example, more effective in expanding con-
sumption and hence GDP.7 Once again, the estimates
by Corsetti et al. (2009b) regarding the effect of
spending expansions in crisis periods appear to sup-
port this notion.
This is an example of a more general problem with
empirical analysis based on VAR models, already
mentioned above in regards to spending policy: the
estimated parameters may vary according to econom-
ic conditions, and so be an unreliable guide to the
multiplier in any other period or country. 
3.2 Microeconomic factors
The discussion of the macroeconomic evidence
implies that the strength of the fiscal multiplier, and
its effects on economic welfare, depends on the partic-
ular measures used and the underlying state of the
economy. Table 3.10 summarises the fiscal stimulus
measures adopted by EU member states in 2009
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Table e 3.10 0  
Fiscal l stimulus s measures s in n the e EU, , 2009
   Net t stimulus s   Net t contraction n 
Country  Percent of GDP Country  Percent of GDP
Revenue e 
Personal income taxes, including 
social contributions, capital gains











































































































































7 Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) discuss the automatic stabilising
properties of the US income tax with reference to the proportion of
consumers who are credit-constrained. EEAG Report 2010 83
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(more details are shown in the Appendix), which is
taken from European Commission (2009a).
It is easy to see how different measures with the same
fiscal cost could have different impacts on aggregate
demand. For example, a credit-constrained house-
hold would generally like to increase its consump-
tion, but is unable to do so because of the lack of
opportunity for borrowing. A tax cut aimed at such
households would be immediately translated into an
increase in consumption, boosting aggregate de-
mand. The effect of the same tax cut on a household
that could already borrow as much as it wanted to
would be much smaller. Broadly, we would expect
such a household to hardly regard the tax cut as
increasing its lifetime wealth. So, such a measure
would tend to generate some additional spending,
but also additional saving. In the context of the
increased uncertainty generated in a recession, it
would be plausible to believe that much of the
increased wealth would initially be saved.8
To see how various measures may have different
effects, compare three forms of fiscal stimulus, say: (a)
an increase in social security benefits for the less well-
off, who are more likely to be credit-constrained; (b) a
continued: Table 3.10
Expenditure e  
Public investment, support for



























































































































Source: European Commission (2009a)
8 Some evidence on households’ response to tax rebates after the
start of the crisis is provided by Parker, Souleles, Johnson and
McClelland (2009), who study the impact of the 90 billion dollar tax
rebates in 2008 on consumer spending in the US. This study finds
the response to be largest for lower-income households and home-
owners. reduction in the general VAT rate; and (c) a reduction
in the income tax rate. Neither (b) nor (c) need to be
targeted towards groups that are more likely to spend
the additional income. It is therefore likely that there
would be a greater effect on aggregate demand per
euro of a fiscal stimulus from (a). 
As Table 3.10 indicates (and the Appendix sets out
in more detail), many countries did enact increases
in social expenditure, which are more likely to lead
to increases in aggregate demand. Unlike most of
the other categories in the Table, only three coun-
tries actually reduced social expenditure. By con-
trast, few countries sought to stimulate their
economies by reducing the VAT rate – and many
sought to offset the costs of a stimulus elsewhere by
increasing the rate. Where the VAT rate was cut, it
was sometimes a temporary measure: the UK, for
example, introduced a lower rate for one year only.
The fact that the VAT rate was due to rise again
may have provided a greater stimulus to higher
spending, as we discuss below. However, many
countries also reduced income taxes and other taxes
on individuals. 
Similar considerations apply to business investment.
Here measures designed to create additional incen-
tives to invest, such as a more generous definition of
taxable profit through increasing depreciation
allowances, may have had some effect for firms that
are not credit-constrained. Of course, even these
firms may be unwilling to respond to such incentives,
given the uncertainty surrounding the returns to
investment.
Such measures are unlikely to have any impact on the
investment of firms which cannot raise finance. By
contrast, for such firms, measures which encourage
lending by banks would have a greater impact on
investment. Alternatively, a simple cut in the tax rate
may achieve this, by allowing firms to retain a higher
proportion of pre-tax profit. However, this would
only be true for firms that were profitable entering the
recession. For firms making a taxable loss, a reduction
in the tax rate may represent a cost, as the value of
any tax rebate would be lower. 
In general, in setting fiscal stimulus packages,
European governments appear to have targeted per-
sonal consumption more than business investment.
While 17 countries did make reforms to business tax-
ation, only 10 of these represented a cut, while 7 actu-
ally increased their tax take from business. 
The apparent preference for measures targeted at per-
sonal consumption may not be surprising if it was
believed that firms would be reluctant to undertake
significant investment in the midst of a recession:
investment is generally more volatile than consump-
tion, and is perhaps less likely to respond to any form
of fiscal stimulus. Nevertheless, investment clearly has
longer term benefits in creating conditions for greater
output in the future. 
Public spending measures were more heavily targeted
towards such activity. Many countries increased pub-
lic investment or provided additional support for
infrastructure spending and research. 
Overall, though, the Table suggests that there has
been no firm consensus amongst EU governments on
the appropriate fiscal response to the financial and
economic crisis. In each of the categories in the Table,
some countries created a positive discretionary stimu-
lus while others created a negative one. This to some
extent may reflect differing conditions between coun-
tries. But it also suggests that there has been consider-
able uncertainty about the appropriate types of fiscal
policy required to best combat the crisis. 
4. When and how should deficits be reduced?
In some parts of the EU at least, the political debate
has moved swiftly on from the need for a fiscal stimu-
lus to a recognition that fiscal deficits have grown sub-
stantially and need to be reduced. This raises two
related questions. First, how quickly should deficits
be reduced? Second, how can they be reduced?
4.1 The costs of maintaining high fiscal deficits 
A first point to note is related to the analysis above.
The larger part of the fiscal deficits currently facing
EU governments does not result from discretionary
policy in response to the financial and economic cri-
sis. It is due to partly to an automatic response, and
partly to structural factors which would have created
larger deficits in any event. The automatic responses
result from lower growth, which is translated into
lower than expected tax receipts and higher than
expected costs of social transfers. 
These automatic factors work in reverse as economies
move out of recession: economic growth will raise rev-
enues (and typically, coming out of a recession, rev-
enues rise more quickly than the underlying growth of
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the economy). And as unemployed and others find
work, social transfers are reduced and replaced by
higher tax revenues. 
It is possible to do some basic calculations to esti-
mate how long it would take for economic growth to
lift the EU back to a position of budget balance.
Take as a starting point the projections made by the
European Commission for revenue and public
expenditure as a proportion of GDP in 2010; these
are 44.1 percent and 51.1 percent respectively, and
would result in an overall stock of public debt of
79.4 percent of GDP. 
Now suppose that the EU returns to a steady state
2 percent growth from 2011 onwards. Assume also
that revenues rise slightly faster than economic
growth (so that the elasticity of revenues with respect
to GDP is 1.1) and that public expenditure is held
constant in real terms. Under this scenario, the EU as
a whole would return to fiscal surplus in 2017, reach-
ing a peak debt/GDP ratio in 2016 of approximately
100 percent. 
Obviously, the return to a fiscal surplus would be
faster if economic growth were higher, and slower if
public expenditure rose in real terms. For example,
if instead, public expenditure grew at just 0.5 per-
cent per year in real terms, then a fiscal surplus
would not be reached until 2019, and the debt/GDP
ratio would peak at 106 percent. On the other hand,
if expenditure were kept constant in real terms, and
growth were 2.5 percent per year, a fiscal surplus
would be reached in 2016, with debt peaking at
95 percent of GDP. 
While there is of course, considerable uncertainty
about future growth rates, and about the ability of EU
governments to hold down public expenditures rela-
tive to the rate of economic growth, these projections
suggest that it will be some years – and possibly a
decade or more – before the EU can reach a fiscal sur-
plus and begin to cut the aggregate stock of debt. Of
course, this will happen more quickly in some coun-
tries than in others. 
What are the costs of maintaining such high levels of
debt? The most obvious cost is that of servicing the
debt through interest payments. At the end of 2009,
the yields on 10 year bonds issued by EU govern-
ments lie mostly in a range between 3.2 percent and
3.8 percent, although some countries lie outside this
range (for example, Ireland and Greece). Yields on
shorter-dated bonds tend to be lower than this. But
very roughly, the nominal cost of servicing debt at
the 2010 level of around 80 percent of GDP is
approximately 3 percent of GDP. For example, the
European Commission’s current projections of the
Box x 3.3 3  
Credit t Default t Swaps s 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial instrument in which the buyer makes a series of payments to the seller in
exchange for a payoff if a credit instrument defaults.
This can be seen as a form of insurance. For example, suppose A lends 100 to B. Then A could purchase a CDS on that
debt which would pay 100 in the event that B defaults on the repayment. The CDS spread is the annual amount that A
pays to the insurer over the length of the contract, expressed as a percentage of the insured amount.
An important difference from a normal insurance contract, though, is that the purchaser of this CDS need not be A. That
is, other investors can purchase the CDS even though they do not bear the underlying risk. That implies that the CDS can 
be used as a speculative instrument rather than as a means of insurance. Such opportunities for speculative investment
raise regulatory issues about such contracts.
The underlying credit instrument can be a government-issued security. For such assets, the spread can be used as a
measure of the price of the risk associated with that security by the market. However, there are caveats to using the spread
for such a purpose. The main caveat is that the CDS only has value if the seller of the security is able to make the
insurance payment in the event the government in question defaults. If, for example, the US government were to default,
then it is highly likely that many financial companies would also default, and the CDS insurance payment would not be
made. The spread should therefore be seen as reflecting the joint probability that the government defaults but that the
seller of the CDS does not default.
Leaving that aside, in a well-functioning capital market, the spread on the CDS should be equal to the annual risk
premium which the government would have to pay on issuing debt. The yield on such debt will also reflect other factors,
such as expectations of future interest rates. So the difference in yields will not exactly match CDS spreads.
1 This is why
the CDS spread itself is potentially a useful measure of the risk premium.
1 The differences in yields across countries are shown in Figure 1.26 in Chapter 1.interest liability in 2010 are: 3 percent of GDP in
Germany, 3.1 percent in France, 3.1 percent in the
UK, 1.9 percent in Spain, and 4.8 percent in Italy. As
the stock of debt inevitably rises, these costs will
increase further.
The cost will rise as interest rates rise above their cur-
rent low levels. And the interest rate for the debt of
any country will depend on how risky that debt is per-
ceived by financial markets. The risk of the debt
depends on a number of factors. Clearly, it depends
on the size of the outstanding debt as a proportion of
GDP. But it also depends on the rate at which that
debt is increasing, and the state and prospects of the
economy. 
In addition, some countries have provided guarantees
to private sector bank debt which could result in large
liabilities but which are not reflected in the measures
of the current stock of public debt. Some evidence on
the extent of the contingent liabilities taken on by
governments through their financial sector interven-
tions is shown in Table 3.10, which shows the size of a
number of different measures undertaken by EU gov-
ernments to stabilise their banking sectors. 
Three forms of intervention are shown: capital injec-
tions, guarantees on bank liabilities, specific relief on
impaired assets and other direct bank support. The
Table also shows the extent of guarantees on
deposits. As would be expected, these forms of inter-
vention varied considerably across countries. To take
one notable example, the UK has injected capital into
banks worth around 2.6 percent of GDP; it has pro-
vided guarantees for bank liabilities of over 11 per-
cent of GDP, and has injected a further nearly 15 per-
cent of GDP in supporting
banks through relief for im-
paired assets and other mea-
sures. As such, the UK clearly
has contingent liabilities that are
not reflected in the figures for
public debt presented in Section
2 of this chapter. Other countries
also have huge contingent liabili-
ties, notably Ireland, and to a
lesser extent, Belgium and the
Netherlands.
One way of assessing the per-
ceived risk is to look at the
spreads of credit default swaps
on sovereign debt. 
Figure 3.1 shows the development of CDS spreads on
10 year bonds issued by a number of governments
since the beginning of 2008. Prior to the development
of the financial crisis, these spreads were typically less
than 0.1 percent. They increased dramatically over the
course of the crisis, reaching much higher levels – and
in the case of Ireland, around 3.5 percent. Since then,
they have declined again, though they remain well
above their pre-crisis levels. 
The spreads at the end of 2009 differ considerably
across countries. Spreads in Germany have fallen
back considerably to around 0.3 percent. The
spreads in France and the USA are slightly higher at
around 0.4 percent. However, the UK’s spread is
only a little under 1 percent, Ireland is at 1.6 percent
and Greece is at 2.6 percent. The higher spread in the
UK may reflect the high level of the current deficit in
the UK, even though its stock of debt is not out of
line with that in France or Germany. It may also
reflect the potential liabilities that the UK has in
providing guarantees to the UK financial system.
The high spreads for Ireland and Greece reflect their
much higher risk. 
The cost to governments in terms of higher interest
payments due to the risk reflected in these CDS
spreads is, however, modest. Most government debt is
issued at a fixed rate of interest. The selling price of a
new government bond will reflect the risk which the
market attaches to that bond, and this implicitly
defines the premium which the government must pay.
Also, as risk rises, the market price of existing debt
falls, reflecting the higher rate of return required by
the market. But it is the owners of existing bonds that
bear this cost through the reduction in the value of
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their asset: the cash paid by the government on exist-
ing debt does not change. 
The cost to governments of the risk premia associat-
ed with these CDS spreads therefore apply only to
new debt and not to the stock of debt. New debt
includes both new borrowing and the replacement of
debt which matures, and so exceeds the fiscal deficit.
(For example, a government with a new debt of say
10 percent of GDP and a risk premium of 0.5 percent
would need to pay an additional 0.05 percent – i.e. one
twentieth of one percent of GDP – a year to service
this debt.) While these amounts may still be signifi-
cant – especially for governments with high current
deficits – they are small relative to the overall costs of
servicing the stock of debt. 
Of course, the longer that these risk premia are main-
tained, though, the more their cost will build up as
more and more of the stock of debt has been issued at
relatively high risk premia. To reduce these risk pre-
mia in the short, medium and long term, it is neces-
sary for governments to demonstrate that they have
credible plans to reduce the deficits in the medium
term, thereby reducing the possibility of eventual
default. 
One option here would be simply to point to the type
of calculations set out above: that with economic
growth and holding down expenditure rises, then
deficits will eventually be closed. But other policies
may also be required. We now discuss options for such
policies.
4.2 Options for reducing deficits
The most obvious problem facing governments that
wish to reduce their fiscal deficits is that doing so may
generate a negative fiscal stimulus, reducing or even
overturning any economic recovery. The evidence for
this is summarised above in Section 3. Given the
depth of the recession which faced the EU in 2008
and 2009, governments should be cautious in raising
taxes or cutting expenditure to reduce their deficits.
The costs associated with a delay in such policies are
relatively small compared with the possible costs of
restricting economic growth. 
But there is an important timing issue. As discussed
in Section 3, timing works mostly through intertem-
poral substitution effects. Consider, for example, the
possibility that a government may try to develop a
credible strategy for reducing its deficit by announc-
ing a rise in income tax. If implemented at an early
stage, when the economy is still at the beginning of its
recovery path, the rise would be expected to generate
some reduction in spending, which would be a nega-
tive shock to the economy. Now compare that option
with an announcement that the rise in income tax will
take effect with sufficient delay – say in one or two
years’ time. In this case, the government would be
delaying the reduction in the deficit, presumably in
the hope of allowing the economy to recover further
before implementing the change. The problem with
this is that individuals who face a future rise in their
income tax perceive a reduction in their lifetime
wealth immediately. They therefore consider them-
selves to be worse off now, and consequently would
be likely to reduce their spending now. There is of
course the possibility that individuals would seek to
bring income forward from the following year in
order to benefit for the lower tax rate while it lasts.
This could provide a stimulus to the economy. But
shifting income across years is generally much harder
than shifting consumption. So it seems implausible
that this effect could outweigh the effects on the
economy of the reduced spending. 
The main lesson here is that, from the vantage point
of the effect of changes in taxes on permanent
income, the announcement of a future income tax rise
may not have specific advantages over the announce-
ment of an immediate income tax rise. The timing of
the fiscal adjustment, however, can and does make a
large difference through channels other than perma-
nent income. 
A clear instance is provided by taxes on consumption,
such as VAT and excise duties. Suppose the govern-
ment announced that the rate of VAT would rise in
one year’s time. This would also reduce the lifetime
wealth of individuals in the sense that, for a given
income, they would be able to afford to buy less goods
and services. The higher tax burden would tend to
depress the economy, as would be the case with other
tax rises. 
However, the announcement could provide an impor-
tant fiscal stimulus, since there would be a clear incen-
tive to bring forward spending to take advantage of
the lower VAT rate before it was increased. This would
provide an immediate stimulus to current private
demand, despite raising additional revenue in the
medium term. 
In some ways such a policy mirrors the fiscal stimulus
measure announced by the UK government inDecember 2008: to reduce the VAT rate from 17.5 per-
cent to 15 percent for a fixed period of about one year.
Arguably the most effective element of this stimulus
was its fixed time period. A permanent reduction in
the VAT rate may not have had a large effect at the
point at which the country entered a recession. But
the fact that the rate increased again a year later is
likely to have had a more significant impact on con-
sumption in 2009. 
A second important instance (already discussed in
Section 3) is the possibility of designing consolida-
tion packages including cuts of government spending
below trend. Anticipation of lower public demand in
the future tends to contain long-term interest rates
(as future short term rates will be lower). Lower real
rates in turn stimulate current demand. The effect of
anticipated cuts is expansionary because, to the ex-
tent that firms set prices subject to nominal rigidities,
today’s prices will already optimally incorporate ex-
pectations of the path of future demand and infla-
tion. With sticky prices, prospective spending cuts (all
else equal) lower prices, containing the dynamic of
inflation, and thus allowing the central bank to be
more expansionary. 
For the above mechanism to work, however, the cen-
tral bank must be able to control policy rates, i.e. the
economy cannot be in a situation in which the central
bank would like to lower policy rates, but it cannot,
because these are already at zero. In these circum-
stances, as shown by Corsetti et al. (2010), the timing
of fiscal adjustment is crucial.
With a near-zero nominal interest rate, implementing
spending cuts too soon would add to the deflationary
pressure of the ongoing recession. These pressures
may end up raising inefficiently the interest rates in
real terms, and may possibly exacerbate the zero-
lower-bound problem. In contrast, a delayed imple-
mentation of spending cuts can be quite beneficial, as
it would help the central bank maintain an expan-
sionary monetary stance after the economy exits from
the zero-lower-bound constraint (and it may shorten
the period of the zero lower bound episode).
These considerations are important in light of the fact
that the large rise in public debt requires fiscal consol-
idation to be substantial. Households reasonably
expect adjustment not to take place exclusively via
increases in taxes but also via some cut in spending.
With interest rates still close to zero, anticipation of
early spending cuts may actually harm the effective-
ness of current fiscal stimulus, as their deflationary
impact materialises when the economy is still strug-
gling with the aftermath of the recessionary shock. A
credible plan gradually phasing in spending cuts over
a two year horizon not only can reduce this risk: it can
also enhance the expansionary impact of the ongoing
fiscal stimulus.
A final point to note here concerns the need for coor-
dination across countries. As noted in the introduc-
tion, in 2008 there was general agreement that enact-
ing a fiscal stimulus would be more effective if all (or
at least many) countries followed a similar policy,
increasing demand everywhere. By contrast, a single
country enacting a stimulus on its own would see
much of the stimulus flowing abroad through the pur-
chase of imports. 
But in light of the need to consolidate debt, mea-
sures to reduce public deficits across the world sum
up to a global recessionary impulse. In this case,
international policy coordination may still be benefi-
cial insofar as it would be a way to internalise the
negative demand spillovers on foreign output created
by fiscal adjustment in a country. To wit: the same
way in which coordination leads to stronger global
stimulus at the start of a recession, coordination
would lead to gradualism in fiscal consolidation
once the initial stimulus is withdrawn. If all coun-
tries simultaneously reduced their deficits by increas-
ing taxes and reducing spending ignoring spillovers,
aggregate demand would fall everywhere too much,
and adjustment would create a much greater reces-
sionary impulse, possibly harming the nascent world
recovery. 
However, coordination is not necessarily desirable.
The risk is that gradualism in the name of coordi-
nation could provide an excuse to delay the adop-
tion of the necessary measures to preserve stability.
Appealing to the need for a coordinated fiscal con-
solidation, for instance, incumbent governments
may leave unpopular decisions for future govern-
ments to make. 
Conversely, in the current circumstances it makes
sense that the worst hit countries or the countries with
the most fragile public finances should adjust upfront
and most deeply so as to prevent the spreading of
concerns about fiscal sustainability. The benefits from
coordination, which may be small initially, can quick-
ly turn largely negative if this ends up interfering with
the most efficient path of debt consolidation.
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5. Conclusions
In this Chapter we have discussed a number of issues
surrounding the large rises in fiscal deficits in Europe.
The key points raised are as follows.
• There have been large increases in budget deficits
throughout the EU, leading to considerable rises in
the stock of public debt as a percentage of GDP. In
2009, the total deficit in the EU was around 6 per-
cent of GDP, and it is expected to rise further in
2010. There has been a corresponding increase in
outstanding debt, rising to 72 percent of GDP in
2009 and to nearly 80 percent of GDP in 2010. 
• There are also wide variations across countries.
The UK, Ireland and Latvia have particularly high
deficits, though in all three cases their outstanding
debt is moderate. Italy, Greece and Belgium have
much higher outstanding debt, though all three
have had high debt for some years.
• These high deficits have generally not reflected dis-
cretionary changes by EU governments. While
most governments introduced a discretionary fiscal
stimulus in 2008 and 2009, these were small relative
to the overall deficits. The form of these discre-
tionary changes (and even their sign) has varied
considerably between countries. 
• There is considerable empirical evidence that a fis-
cal stimulus has a positive effect on output,
although there are many problems in measuring
the effect, so that the size of the fiscal multiplier is
not known with any certainty. In any case, there is
little reason to suppose that effects estimated on
historic data are likely to be valid in the midst of a
recession. This is particularly the case when inter-
est rates are effectively at zero and the economy is
shaken by an ongoing financial and economic cri-
sis, when there may be very large multipliers for
government spending. There is also little reason to
suppose that different forms of fiscal intervention
have similar effects.
• The scope for reducing deficits depends crucially
on the rate of economic growth achieved over the
next few years, and the degree to which real public
spending can be curtailed. For example, a simple
calculation suggests that if spending is kept con-
stant in real terms throughout the EU, then eco-
nomic growth of around 2 percent would see the
aggregate EU deficit reduced to zero by 2017, with
outstanding debt reaching a peak of around 100
percent of GDP. Of course, some countries would
need a higher growth rate to achieve fiscal balance
within this period. 
• There are costs of maintaining high levels of debt,
though these should not be exaggerated. Especially
at low interest rates, the cost of servicing debt is of
the order of 3 percent of GDP, though again there
is considerable variation across member states.
Two factors could increase this cost in the short to
medium term. First, interest rates are likely to rise.
Second, public debt appears increasingly risky to
the market, which implies that higher risk premia
could be charged.
• Although these risk premia are currently not large,
they could be lowered – or at least prevented from
growing – if governments announced credible
strategies to reduce deficits over the medium term.
A downside of such a strategy is that announce-
ments of future tax rises may hamper the economy
immediately as individuals perceive their lifetime
income to be lower. 
• One way of reconciling the need for a credible
deficit-reduction strategy with the need to avoid
harming a fragile economy is to announce rises in
taxes on spending – such as VAT – to take effect
from some future period, say in one year’s time.
This would induce individuals to bring spending
forward, which would provide a temporary stimu-
lus to the economy. 
• Another way consists of announcing well-designed
measures bringing government spending on goods
and services below trend, to be implemented suffi-
ciently far in the future as to avoid the risk of
exposing the economy to additional deflationary
pressures when policy interest rates are still close to
zero. Provided that they are not implemented too
early, future spending cuts are beneficial to the
recovery, as they contain the rise in long-term
interest rates (as well as attenuating concerns about
debt sustainability).
• A final point concerns co-ordination. In attempt-
ing to stimulate the economy there were gains from
co-ordination. For an individual country, a stimu-
lus to spending might be largely reflected in
increased imports, creating demand for goods and
services produced elsewhere. A coordinated policy
reduces this risk. In principle, the same argument
also applies (with a different sign) to fiscal adjust-
ment. If all countries implemented a contrac-
tionary fiscal adjustment simultaneously and inde-
pendently, without internalizing negative output
spillovers abroad, then this would be likely to ham-
per the economic recovery. This adverse effect
would be reduced if such policies were introduced
in a coordinated way, possibly leading to more
gradualism. • However, coordinated gradualism should not
interfere with the adoption of measures necessary
to preserve stability. The worst hit countries or the
countries with the most fragile public finances
should adjust upfront and most deeply, to prevent
the spreading of concerns about fiscal sustainabil-
ity. If gradualism in the name of coordination
feeds doubts about debt consolidation, then no
coordination is a much better option.
References 
Auerbach, A. and D. Feenberg (2000), “The Significance of Federal
Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14,
37–56. 
Barro, R. J. and C. J. Redlick (2009), “Macroeconomic Effects from
Government Purchases and Taxes”, NBER Working Paper 25369.
Baxter, M. and R. King (1993), “Fiscal Policy in General Equilibri-
um”, American Economic Review 83, 315–34. 
Beetsma R., M. Giuliodori and F. Klaasen (2006), “Trade Spillovers
of Fiscal Policy in the European Union: a Panel Analysis”, Economic
Policy, 48, 640–87.
Bilbiie, F., A. Meier and G. Müller (2008), “What Accounts for the
Changes in U.S. Fiscal Policy Transmission?”, Journal of Money
Credit and Banking, 40, 1439–70. 
Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002), “An Empirical Characterization
of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and
Taxes on Output”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1329–68. 
Caldara, D. and C. Kamps (2008), “What are the Effects of Fiscal
Policy Shocks? A VAR-based Comparative Analysis”, European
Central Bank Working Paper 877. 
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo (2009), “When is the
Government Expenditure Multiplier Large?”, NBER Working Paper
15394.
Corsetti, G., A. Meier and G. Müller (2009a), “Fiscal Stimulus with
Spending Reversals”, International Monetary Fund Working Paper
09/106. 
Corsetti, G., A. Meier and G. Müller, G. (2009b), “When Where and
How Does Fiscal Stimulus Work”, mimeo, EUI.
Corsetti, G., K. Kuester, A. Meier and G. Müller (2010), “Debt Con-
solidation and Fiscal Stabilization of Deep Recessions”, American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, forthcoming.
De Castro, F. and P. de Cos (2008), “The Economic Effects of Fiscal
Policy: the Case of Spain”, Journal of Macroeconomics 30, 1005–28. 
Eggertsson, G. (2009), “What Fiscal Policy is Effective at Zero
Interest Rate”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 402,
November.
Eggertsson G. and M. Woodford (2004), “Optimal Monetary and
Fiscal Policy in a Liquidity Trap”, NBER International Seminar on
Macroeconomics 2004.
Erceg, C.J. and J. Lindé (2010), “Is there a Fiscal Free Lunch in a
Liquidity Trap?” CEPR Discussion Paper 7624.
European Commission (2009a), “Public Finances in EMU”, Euro-
pean Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs.
European Commission (2009b), “Sustainability Report 2009”, Euro-
pean Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs.
Eurostat (1995), “European System of Accounts”, 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/ESA95/en/titelen.htm
Fatás, A. and I. Mihov (2001), “The Effects of Fiscal Policy on
Consumption and Employment: Theory and Evidence”, CEPR
Discussion Paper 2760. 
Favero, C. and F. Giavazzi (2007), “Debt and the effect of fiscal pol-
icy”, NBER Working Paper 12822. 
Galí, J., J.D. López-Salido and J. Vallés (2007), “Understanding the
Effects of Government Spending on Consumption”, Journal of the
European Economic Association 5, 227–70. 
Giavazzi, F.and M. Pagano (1990), “Can Severe Fiscal Contractions
be Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries”, NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 5, 75–111.
Giavazzi, F., T. Jappelli and M. Pagano (2000), “Searching for Non-
Linear Effects of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Industrial and De-
veloping Countries”, European Economic Review 44, 1259–89.
Giordano, R., S. Momigliano, S. Neri and R. Perotti (2007), “The
effects of fiscal policy in Italy: Evidence from a VAR model”, Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy 22, 707–733.
Hebous, S. (2009), “The Effects of Discretionary Fiscal Policy on
Macroeconomic Aggregates: A Reappraisal”, mimeo, University of
Frankfurt.
Heppke-Falk, K., J. Tenhofen and G. Wolff (2006), “The Macro-
economic Effects of Exogenous Fiscal Policy Shocks in Germany: a
Disaggregated Analysis”, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper 41. 
Ilzetzki E., E. Mendoza and C.A. Vegh (2009), “How Big are Fiscal
Multipliers?”, CEPR Policy Insight 39.
IMF Staff Position Note (2008), “Fiscal Policy for the Crisis”,
SPN/08/01. 
Kellaway, M. (2009), “Public Sector Interventions in the Financial
Crisis”, London, Office for National Statistics.
Mertens, K. and M. Ravn (2009), “Understanding the Aggregate
Effects of Anticipated and Unanticipated Tax policy Shocks”,
mimeo, EUI. 
Mountford, A. and H. Uhlig (2009), “What are the Effects of Fiscal
Policy Shocks?, Journal of Applied Econometrics 24. 960–92
Pappa, E. (2009a), “The Effects of Fiscal Shocks on Employment
and Real Wages”, International Economic Review 50, 217–44. 
Pappa, E. (2009b), “The Effects of Fiscal Expansions: an Interna-
tional Comparison”, mimeo, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. 
Parker J. A., N. S. Souleles, D. S. Johnson and R. McClelland (2009),
“Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus Payments of
2008”, mimeo, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Perotti. R. (1999), “Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 114(4), 1399–1436.
Perotti, R. (2005), “Estimating the Effect of Fiscal Policy in OECD
Countries”, Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0503/fpoecd.pdf. 
Perotti, R. (2007), “In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of
Fiscal Policy”, NBER Macroeconomic Manual 2007 22, 169–226. 
Ramey, A. (2008), “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s
All in the Timing”, NBER Working Paper 15464. 
Ramey, A. and M. D. Shapiro (1998), “Costly Capital Reallocation
and the Effects of Government Spending”, Carnegie-Rochester Con-
ference Series on Public Policy 48, 145–94. 
Ravn, M., S. Schmitt-Grohé and M. Uribe (2007), “Examining the
Effects of Government Spending Shocks on Consumption and the
Real Exchange Rate”, mimeo, Duke University. 
Reinhart, C. M. and K. Rogoff (2008), “Banking Crises: An Equal
Opportunity Menace”, NBER Working Paper 14587.
Romer, C. and D. Romer (2010), “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax
Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks”,
American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Sims, C.A. (1980), “Macroeconomics and reality”, Econometrica 48, 1–48.
Tenhofen, J. and G. Wolff (2007), Does Anticipation of Government
Spending Matter? Evidence from an Expectation Augmented VAR,
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper 14. 
Uhlig, H. (2005) What are the effects of monetary policy? Results
from an agnostic identification procedure. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 52, 381–419.
Van den Noord, P. (2000), The Size and the Role of Automatic Fiscal
Stabilizers in the 1990s and Beyond, OECD Economics Department
Working Paper 230. 
Villaverde J. F. (2010), “Fiscal Policy in a Model With Financial
Frictions”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, forth-
coming.
Woodford M. (2010), Simple Analytics of the Government
Expenditure Multiplier, presented 2010 AEA meetings.
EEAG Report 2010 90






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































;EEAG Report 2010 100
Chapter 3
m
o
r
t
g
a
g
e
s
(
–
 
0
.
1
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
;
A
b
o
l
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
w
e
a
l
t
h
 
t
a
x
(
–
 
0
.
2
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
e
x
-
p
e
n
s
e
s
 
d
e
d
u
c
t
i
b
l
e
(
0
.
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
s
 
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
t
 
o
f
f
 
G
D
P
)
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
F
u
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
(
+
 
0
.
7
2
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
F
r
o
n
t
-
l
o
a
d
i
n
g
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
(
0
.
2
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
f
o
r
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
S
u
b
s
i
d
y
 
f
o
r
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
s
 
o
f
 
n
e
w
c
a
r
s
 
(
0
.
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
F
u
n
d
 
t
o
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
(
+
 
0
.
2
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
f
o
r
 
b
u
s
i
-
n
e
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
(
0
.
2
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
w
e
l
f
a
r
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
(
0
.
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
h
o
u
s
i
n
g
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
(
0
.
2
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
H
o
u
s
i
n
g
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
-
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
a
n
d
 
m
a
i
n
-
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
f
r
a
-
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
(
+
 
0
.
2
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
i
n
f
r
a
-
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
(
–
 
0
.
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
(
+
 
0
.
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
e
d
u
-
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
(
–
 
0
.
3
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
c
o
a
c
h
i
n
g
,
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
 
(
+
 
0
.
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
L
a
b
o
u
r
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
(
–
 
0
.
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
O
t
h
e
r
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
:
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
n
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
n
 
(
2
0
0
9
a
)
.
 
 